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Abstract 
 
The European Union designation of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party as an international 
terrorist organization has led to a profound distrust of the EU on the part of the PKK. 
This has resulted in a perception that the Kurdish organization has turned against the 
EU and withdrawn its support for Turkey’s accession. The PKK activities and 
viewpoints as presented and discussed in this article, however, indicate that this is not 
the case. Politically squeezed at home and sidelined abroad, it is argued, the PKK is, in 
fact, primarily concerned to (re)gain recognition as a representative of Turkey’s Kurds 
(upon which it is making its support for Turkey’s accession conditional).  
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
As of 2002, the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan, the PKK) found itself 
designated an international terrorist organization. The international proscription of the PKK 
that came with its entry onto the EU, US and UK terrorist lists constituted the beginning of a 
new era for the main actor in Turkey’s Kurdish nationalist movement. Having waged an 
insurgency war against the Turkish state since 1984, the PKK had long been branded 
‘terrorist’ by the Turkish state, and the civil disruption and criminality associated with the 
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organization and its affiliates in Europe had led Germany and France to order the closure of 
the organization’s branches in their territories during the mid 1990s. Nevertheless, the 
classification of the PKK as an international terrorist organization in the wake of September 
11th was particularly hard to digest for the party and its followers – so much so that the 
Europe-based PKK-related organizations have devoted much of their time to divesting 
themselves of the ‘terrorist’ stigma and restoring the organization’s legitimacy as a social-
political movement. To this end, legal and political activities as well as socio-political protest 
events have been staged in Europe. These activities attest to ongoing (albeit weakening) 
efforts of the Kurdish nationalist movement’s main actor to capitalize on international 
support, in particular with regards to the EU member states and its institutions, which are in 
continuing negotiations with Turkey over its possible future accession.  
This paper bears testimony to a deepening sense of distrust on the part of the PKK towards the 
EU institutions that had previously served it well, and attests to an ongoing struggle by the 
former for the creation of a political space that is inclusive of the organization deemed to 
represent Turkey’s most politicized Kurds. Consequently, these findings reject the thesis of 
Uslu (2008), that since late 2005 the PKK has sought to actively undermine the Turkey-EU 
accession negotiations. The findings reported here indicate that what has been happening is 
best understood not as a move by the PKK away from the EU, but as an ongoing attempt by 
the organization to be incorporated into the negotiations over Turkey’s future, and thus the 
future of Turkey’s Kurds, as well as a concern for its own survival, especially as the centre of 
gravity in Turkey’s Kurdish activism moves from violent to peaceful means, participating in 
rather than excluded from the country’s political system. In other words, the PKK is not 
seeking to actively undermine Turkey’s accession to the European Union, but has turned its 
own political recognition into the condition for its support. 
This paper begins with a brief introduction of Turkey’s Kurdish question, focusing 
particularly on how the PKK and its political wing or allies have evolved since the start of its 
insurgency in 1984 up to the present. Then, special attention is drawn to PKK’s installation 
and activities in Europe since the mid 1980s. This is to serve a better understanding of the 
effects of the listing for the PKK’s operational space in Europe, as well as the current 
initiatives undertaken in the light of the terrorist designation. After elaborating on the 
consequences of the terrorist labelling and how it was received by PKK political activists and 
sympathizers, the paper explores the initiatives aimed at (re)gaining political legitimacy in the 
international political arena, upon which support for Turkey’s accession to the European 
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Union is made conditional. The value of the terrorist designation itself - moral, practical or 
otherwise - is not the main concern of this paper, it should be emphasized, but rather the 
impact of the designation on the PKK positioning in relation to the European Union. 
 
 
BACKGROUND 
The Kurdish Question in Turkey and the armed conflict with the PKK 
In the inter-war period when the Republic of Turkey arose from the remains of the Ottoman 
Empire, Mustafa Kemal (Atatürk) led a revolutionary reconstruction of the territory. This 
involved, among other things, a nationalist project of ‘Turkification’, and in mainly Kurdish 
provinces of the south-east of the country, a series of rebellions was crushed (McDowall, 
1996; Taspinar, 2005; Jongerden 2007). By the 1950s, Kurdish (and other) identities had been 
technically cleansed by the ‘Kemalist’ ideology (Kurds were re-designated as ‘mountain 
Turks’). Various forms of martial law and direct rule from Ankara were applied, and further 
post-war periods of repression followed a succession of military coups (1960, ’71, ’80). It 
took until the end of the 1960s for Kurdish dissidents to politically reorganize, and it was only 
in the mid 80s that Kurds took up arms again, with a fully-fledged insurgency instigated 
against the Turkish state.   
Officially established in 1978, the PKK started its armed insurgency in 1984, which, although 
interrupted by ceasefires of varying durations, continues to this day. The PKK initially aimed 
at ‘a destruction of colonialism’ – referring to all the state-forces ‘occupying’ the Kurdish 
populated region of the north-western Middle East (i.e. including territory in Syria, Iraq and 
Iran, not just Turkey – and ‘the construction of a democratic and united Kurdistan, based on 
Marxist-Leninist principles’ (Jongerden & Akkaya, 2011). After the 1980 coup, which had led 
to the imprisonment and exile of almost all leftist and Kurdish nationalist party leaders and 
militants, the PKK leadership fled Turkey for Syria. This left the party one of the very few 
radical leftist or Kurdish organizations in or from Turkey that was still operational (Jongerden 
& Akkaya, 2010). The PKK set about implementing a guerrilla war on Maoist principles, 
through which it was able to effectively takeover large tracts of the countryside in the south-
east by the early 1990s. The Turkish military responded, however, and the tide was turned. By 
the beginning of the millennium the state had largely regained control of the situation, by a 
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variety of legal and illegal methods.2 The security situation today remains tense and 
unresolved, with a small but steady stream of deaths on both sides and unrest in cities. 
After the capture of its leader and co-founder, Abdullah Öcalan, in 1999, the PKK 
transformed itself ideologically and organizationally, upon Öcalan’s guidelines passed 
through lawyers from his prison cell on the island of Imralli (Marcus, 2007a; Gunter 2008). 
The PKK today no longer advocates separation from Turkey as official policy, but seeks the 
transformation of – and its integration into – a democratized, confederalized Turkey (Akkaya 
& Jongerden, 2011).  
The PKK has sought to engage in negotiations for a peace agreement on several occasions, 
starting from 1993, when it first called upon Turkey to end the fighting by announcing a 
unilateral ceasefire. Other unilateral ceasefires followed – the longest in the period 1999-2004 
– but Turkey has tended to interpret these as a sign of weakness and/or the result of military 
defeat, and uses the terrorist label to avoid direct, open talks. Unfortunately, tragically even, 
this is a misreading of the enemy on the part of the state that represents a history of wasted 
time and lost opportunities. The assumption, especially since Öcalan’s capture, that PKK 
peace moves have been forced by military weakness is erroneous insofar as these have been 
importantly rooted also, arguably more so, in the organization’s increased capacities, its 
ability, that is, to operate within the political framework of the state (and Europe) in raising 
mass popular support and developing organizational networks (based in the Kurdish cities 
inside Turkey and amongst the Diaspora in Europe). The emergence of its press and 
establishment of pro-Kurdish parties as mentioned, along with, for example, huge 
demonstrations in support of slain guerrillas have long confirmed to the PKK the strength of 
other action repertoires besides classical Maoist insurgency.  
Coincidently, it was during the period around the international terrorist listing of the PKK, 
that the pro-Kurdish Democratic Society Party (Demokratik Toplum Partisi, DTP) established 
itself, with representation at both the national and the local levels. The DTP was generally 
seen as the political wing of the PKK, although this was unclear (necessarily, given the PKK’s 
terrorist status at home) and thus sometimes queried by outsiders, or just allowed to remain 
ambivalent.3 Compared to its predecessors HEP (1990-1993), DEP (1993-1994) and HADEP 
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(1995-2002), which mainly operated during the heat of the conflict and were thus severely 
confined, DEHAP (2003-2005) and DTP (2005-2009), working in a less tense political 
climate, were able to promote more concrete political programs that incorporated the 
(changing) goals of the PKK (see below).  
The Kurdish political parties began to run an increasing number of municipal authorities in 
the South-East after the 1999 local elections, rising to as many as 54 municipality mayors 
across eleven provinces, and nine mayors of the provincial capitals by the end of the decade, 
while the DTP was represented in parliament by 21 MPs following the 2007 national election 
(elected as ‘independent-candidates’ in order to circumvent Turkey’s 10% electoral 
threshold). It was through the DTP control of the region, especially of the municipalities, that 
the PKK was able to maintain and even extend its dominance and popularity there (Marcus, 
2007b).  
The DTP can thus be regarded as putting into practice the new ideological project advocated 
by Abdullah Öcalan, with many of its political representatives themselves former activists (or 
‘activists in office’), and pursuing the contentious politics of a (Kurdish/minority/human) 
rights based agenda (Watts, 2006). Many authors have testified to how the lifting of the state 
of emergency in the South-East in the 2000s opened the way for a more self-conscious 
Kurdish associational life, and how the DTP run municipalities contributed to the emergence 
of a new Kurdish public sphere (e.g. Öktem, 2008; Gambetti, 2008; Marcus, 2007a and 
2007b; Watts, 2006). At the end of 2009, however, following an indictment two years 
previously, the DTP was finally closed – like other pro-Kurdish parties before – found to have 
violated Article 68 of the Constitution (i.e. in conflict with the ‘independence of the state’ and 
‘indivisible integrity’ of its territory and nation). Upon the banning of the DTP, the pro-
Kurdish party was promptly replaced by its successor – again, as on previous similar 
occasions – the pro-Kurdish Peace and Democracy Party (Bariş ve Demokrasi Partisi, BDP). 
 
Increased competition over the political representation of Turkey’s Kurds 
The new Kurdish public sphere has been developing simultaneously with an increased 
political competition over the representation of Turkey’s Kurds between the Kurdish 
nationalist movement and Turkey’s ruling party since 2002, the conservative Muslim Justice 
and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, AKP). Constituting the first majority 
6 
 
government for a generation and successfully pushing forward the necessary political and 
economic reforms for the country to become a candidate for full membership of the EU, the 
AKP has generally found favour in Brussels. The coming to power of the AKP has also 
significantly affected the Kurdish issue in Turkey, including the PKK (Bahcheli and Sid, 
2011).  
Although continuing a process that had actually been initiated by the previous government, it 
was the AKP that officially ended the state of emergency. Through this initial engagement 
with reforms, the AKP government managed to present itself as a party actively seeking to 
integrate different ethnic and religious minorities in Turkey and devoted to the 
‘democratization’ of the country. This enabled the party during its first years in office to 
extend its electoral support amongst Turkey’s Kurds, as well as gain favour amongst those 
within the EU institutions in favour of the country’s accession.  
As a result of the success of the AKP, particularly during its first administration, the DTP, like 
its predecessors, not only experienced continual political isolation inside Turkey (see Öktem, 
2008), and repeated demands that it distance itself from the ‘terrorists’ (PKK) – a call echoed 
in the EU-Turkey accession negotiations (see below) – but it has also found itself under 
pressure in its natural constituency. Electorally, the DTP found itself in competition with the 
AKP, and the PKK began treating what had become its main rival as its number one enemy 
(even above, that is, the Kemalist state military), with its media and leadership actively 
involved in efforts to discredit the ruling party (Uslu, 2008). This has taken the form of 
targeting not only AKP intentions regarding the Kurdish issue, but also its politics more 
generally. Although the DTP was triumphant in the 2009 local elections, the Kurdist party 
(now BDP) continues to regard the AKP as its biggest threat. 
All of which rather begs the question: are the AKP and PKK/DTP/BDP merely involved in a 
turf war for the political ascendancy, or do they have genuinely different visions for the way 
ahead? This is relevant not just for a better assessment of the PKK and what has transpired in 
terms of its approach to Turkey’s EU accession over recent years, but also because it might 
give clues about the likely future of these. A brief review of events last year gives some clues 
here. In the spring of 2009, the AKP opened a new era of public debate in Turkey in respect 
of the Kurdish issue when it announced the launch of a Kurdish initiative (Kürt açılım), 
intended to solve the longstanding problem of the South-East. By the end of the summer, 
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however, it had become clear that the government would neither engage in direct, open 
political dialogue with the PKK, nor accept the DTP as interlocutor.  
Under extreme pressure from the establishment (the judiciary and the military), and the two 
main opposition parties (Turkish nationalist and Kemalist), as well as large sections of the 
media, the AKP first broadened and diluted its Kurdish initiative to a democratic one 
(demokratik açılım), which focused instead on other social groups (Alevis, Romani Gypsies) 
and a normalization in foreign relations (with Turkey’s Eastern neighbours). Then it confined 
its solution to the Kurdish question to cultural and linguistic aspects (e.g. loosening 
restrictions on Kurdish language use), while shelving the more difficult political issues (e.g. 
relevant changes to the constitution, what to do with the PKK).  
Cotemporaneous efforts by the PKK and DTP that sought to steer the initiative in the 
direction of negotiations – by means of the submission of Öcalan’s Roadmap in the summer 
of 2009, and the symbolic return of groups of PKK members and families from the mountains 
and the Mahmur Refugee camp in Iraq – only increased the establishment and opposition 
parties’ critique of the whole initiative as a surrender to the ‘terrorists’. Öcalan’s attempted 
involvement was rejected and his roadmap misplaced by the authorities. The crowds and DTP 
motorcade that greeted the returnees, meanwhile, were perceived as provocative, appearing to 
the country at large as rather shocking images of PKK victory celebrations. Indeed, it was 
shortly after this incident that the DTP was banned, paying the price, many would argue, for a 
major strategic blunder, its own misreading of the other side and wasting of an opportunity 
(Jenkins 2009; Casier, Hilton and Jongerden, 2009). 
To a certain extent the restriction of the AKP Kurdish initiative has been due to the small 
room for manoeuvre the government has. Its continued failure to really follow through with 
its professed aims, however, has fuelled cynicism about the initiative, as primarily dictated by 
electioneering politics. Certainly the AKP seems to have assumed the old economic analysis 
that has Kurdish discontent as originating from poverty and under-development rather than 
oppression and disenfranchisement. Through the resumption of the old GAP plans, a vast dam 
project for land irrigation and hydro-electric power, it seeks to tackle the economic grievances 
that are thought to underlie PKK support in the region and thus deny ‘terrorism’ its breeding 
ground. Given the general reluctance of the government to engage in any form of political 
dialogue and its recent reframing of the initiative as the ultimate struggle against ‘terrorism’, 
therefore, Turkey’s Kurdish movement has increasingly felt driven into a corner (and all the 
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more so with the closure of the DTP and ongoing raids and arrests of BDP members in the 
first half of 2010). 
To conclude, both Turkey’s Kurdish question and its main actor have evolved considerably 
over the last decades, not only since the beginning of the armed conflict in the mid-1980s but 
also since the PKK terrorist designation early in the millennium. In addition to its lengthy 
unilateral ceasefires and change of ideological tack from secession to federalism, the role 
played by the DTP/BDP in conventional politics has made it even more difficult to pin-down 
where the presence of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party in Kurdish society really begins or ends, 
complicating its designation as ‘terrorist’. At the same time, a competition has developed with 
the ruling AKP for the claim to represent Turkey’s Kurdish population in the region, played 
out in the media and at the ballot box. This has given rise to a deepening animosity between 
the Kurdish nationalist movement and the current Turkish government, and forms the 
background against which the narrative of this paper should be understood. The PKK and its 
supporters have perceived themselves to be doubly confined, first by the international terrorist 
designation and second by the political challenges they face inside the region, and it is this 
particular combination of confinements that has informed the recent approach of the PKK to 
Turkey’s EU application. Furthermore, it might be added, the current situation (i.e. in respect 
of the lack of progress or hope even of such from the AKP’s Kurdish/democratic initiative) 
indicates that the present dynamic will be a continuing one. 
 
THE PKK PRESENCE IN EUROPE 
The PKK ‘struggle’ did not remain confined to the Kurdish region of Turkey and its 
neighbours, but was continued on European soil, where the PKK established itself very early 
on in its history. Among the growing European Kurdish Diaspora, there developed a 
transnational Kurdish community which included the cross-border political organization of 
Kurds from Turkey (Grojean, 2008; Watts, 2004; Adamson, 2002; Östergaard-Nielsen, 2001; 
Van Bruinessen, 1998).  
The pro-PKK associations, set up since the mid 1980s proved helpful in obtaining public and 
political support among European Kurds, within a section of European public opinion and 
from a number of European politicians. Solidarity networks were built-up with small, extreme 
leftist organizations that were ideologically close to the PKK. Contacts were developed 
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between leftist and Kurdish nationalist politicians holding seats in regional and national 
parliaments in different European countries as well as in the European Parliament (Casier, 
2011). This provided the PKK and its sympathizers with concrete means to advocate their 
cause and to publicize the plight of Kurds living in Turkey, particularly during the height of 
the armed conflict. PKK militants could collect financial contributions from European Kurds, 
call for hunger strikes and demonstrations, set up a satellite television station, radio stations 
and newspapers (Grojean, 2008; Watts, 2004; Eccarius-Kelly, 2002) and develop their own 
network of ‘diplomats’, all of which gave leverage to an increased visibility of their 
promotion of the Kurdish cause.  
The tolerance of PKK activities and criticisms coming from European politicians enraged the 
Turkish authorities, whose embassies and diplomats were continually engaged in attempts to 
discredit the Kurdish organization (e.g. as funded by the narcotics trade and extortion from 
the European Kurdish populations). Turkey pressured the western European governments to 
crack down on PKK activities on their soil, threatening them in turn with withdrawal from 
economically important contracts and lucrative arm deals (Grojean, 2008). This pressure 
gradually began to take effect, with increased governmental surveillance of PKK activities in 
a number of European countries. Although this was largely ineffective, it did pave the way for 
Europe’s acceding to Turkey’s request to list the PKK as an international terrorist 
organization.  
 
THE LISTING OF THE PKK AS AN INTERNATIONAL TERRORIST ORGANIZATION 
The first country in Europe to list the PKK as a terrorist organization was the UK.  With a 
thirty-year history of ‘terrorism’ in Ulster / Northern Ireland, the UK responded quickly to the 
changed environment following the 9/11 attacks in the US, and, as of 28th March 2001, the 
PKK found itself officially listed as a terrorist organization alongside eighteen other foreign 
organizations active in the United Kingdom (UK, 2001). The EU started listing organizations 
and individual as terrorists from December 2001 onwards, when it largely copied the 
regulation worked out in the US Patriot Act drawn up during the year 2000 motivated by the 
9/11 attacks and principally with Al-Qaeda / the Taliban in mind. The first EU list of 29 
individuals and thirteen groups and entities included national insurgent movements (ETA, 
Real IRA, etc), but omitted the PKK (EC, 2001). This was soon amended, however, and in the 
spring of 2002 the PKK was proscribed in Europe, included among the expanded listing of 23 
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groups and formally named as ‘involved in terrorist acts’ by the Council of the European 
Union (EC, 2002 :1).4 The original EU decision to place the PKK on the terrorist list has been 
confirmed since by the six-monthly review of the list, to which the post-2004 casualties and 
bomb attacks attributed to the PKK or claimed by TAK (Teyrêbazên Azadiya Kurdistan, 
Kurdistan Freedom Falcons), an affiliated splinter-group, undoubtedly played a significant 
role 
Officially, the international terrorist lists were aimed at targeting the funding of terrorism, 
through travel restrictions and the freezing of assets. Their real aim, however, was political, as 
acknowledged by the EU Anti-Terror Coordinator, Gilles Van de Kerckhove: ‘The reasons 
are political. You say that it is a criminal organization, not a political organization. That is the 
message’ (Van de Kerckhove, 20th October 20095). Interestingly, the message was not 
necessarily intended to be entirely one-sided, at least not in the case of national insurgencies. 
In fact, executives like Van de Kerckhove go so far as to regard the lists as ‘assets’, to employ 
against the state as well as insurgents. In particular, on Turkey, he argued that ‘The list can be 
a means to leverage, to pressure Turkey to respect its minorities and human rights,’ implying 
that international recognition of Turkey’s ‘terrorism problem’ would facilitate the engagement 
of the Turkish authorities with the EU’s political concerns.  
However, the extent to which the lists are necessary, really can be and actually are being used 
as leverage to pressure the different parties in the conflict is debatable. In Turkey’s case, first, 
its desire to join the EU is already leverage in itself, with vastly more traction than anything 
the terrorist listing can provide; second, the existence of the lists certainly appears to have an 
opposite effect, i.e. to support those state actors that do not want to enter into negotiations for 
peace, but to proceed with a conventional counter insurgency approach against non-state 
combatants; and third, the listing has also undermined certain human rights in respect of the 
organizations listed, such as the freedom of expression and association.  
On this point the EU action can be considered problematic. Turkey’s problem with human 
rights has been one of the principle obstacles in its entry passage to Europe, and the Kurdish 
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issue in the South-East the major part of this. And yet the EU seems not only to fall short of 
its own standards (the standard critique of Western anti-terror legislation taking on a sharp 
irony here), but also to have been guilty of a major disconnect in failing to appreciate that its 
terrorist designation would exacerbate the very human rights abuses it condemns. Thus, recent 
EU reports note concern about Ankara’s 2006 amendments to its Anti-Terror law (EP, 2008), 
leading to the entirely predictable conclusion of ‘undue restrictions on fundamental human 
rights’ (EC, 2009: 30).6 In the eyes of the PKK, the EU is culpable in this for its branding of 
the organization (see below), which the same reports only confirm when, for example, the 
European Parliament ‘reiterates its solidarity with Turkey in its fight against terrorism and 
once again calls on the PKK to declare and respect an immediate and unconditional ceasefire’ 
(EP 2008: 9).  
Obviously there is a need for the EU to confirm to Turkey that it can be a trusted partner that 
shows genuine concern for Turkey’s internal and regional stability – Turkish sensitivities 
cannot just be ignored. This means that simple de-proscrition is not a realistic option. Most 
probably it needs to be linked to progress towards a negotiated resolution of the conflict, 
which would seem to mitigate for a deep involvement on the part of the EU in Turkey’s 
‘peace process’.  
Unfortunately, such a proactive approach by the EU has not been forthcoming. Instead, 
therefore, a one-sided policy has led the PKK’s designation as a terrorist organization to 
become deeply ingrained in the accession negotiations. As a result, the main problems 
concerning the lack of willingness to reform on the Turkish side are linked to the ongoing and 
recently increased uncertainty about Turkey’s entry into the European Union. The lack of 
anything like a complete commitment to Turkey by the EU means, therefore, that the effect of 
the designation remains questionable in this regard. It may well be that the PKK terrorist 
designation works against conflict resolution and thus exacerbates the human rights situation 
in the South-East which therefore continues to drag on Turkey’s accession process leaving 
Turkey to ‘sort out its own mess’ before accession can even be countenanced – a prospect 
which, frankly, would not unduly worry many in Europe and, unfortunately, does appear to be 
the most likely scenario for the short to medium term future.  
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While practical anti-terrorism measures have affected the PKK and its militants and 
sympathizers to some extent, curtailing some activities, the de-legitimizing effect is crucial. 
The labelling has had profound effects on the political and societal space for the Kurdish 
movement both in Turkey and in Europe – so much so that the majority of PKK initiatives 
undertaken at the diplomatic level have been to address the labelling and its consequences, 
rather than straightforwardly articulating grievances and demands and advocating for Kurds in 
Turkey.  
 
FACED WITH THE TERRORIST DESIGNATION  
Taking an agency-oriented perspective, which incorporates the ways in which actors present 
their problems and develop coalitions (Smith & Bakker, 2005), the following sections engage 
with how the listing has been received inside the circles of PKK militants and sympathizers. 
Having the actors ‘speak for themselves’ is not meant to provide a platform to proclaim 
and/or promote their aims and means, but allows a better understanding of these actors and 
their collective psychology that steers strategic choices being made. The response to the 
listing and an assessment of its effects are contextualized here in the relationship between the 
PKK and the EU institutions.  
‘European states are being taken hostage by Turkish Policies’ – proscription as betrayal  
The proscription of the PKK as a terrorist organization and the condemnations of terrorism in 
EU official communications have been perceived as a betrayal by the leading figures in the 
PKK and their followers. Engaging in an inquiry of this shared sense of betrayal is important 
in order to understand the anti-EU rhetoric of a number of leading figures within the PKK that 
has followed the terrorist listing (as described by Uslu, 2008), and, at the same time, the 
continuation of the PKK’s engagement with the European Union.   
The feeling of betrayal relates strongly to both the timing of the first proscription and a 
‘politics of suffering’. Regarding the timing, the PKK was defined as a terrorist organization 
not only during a long period of (unilateral) cease-fire but also following Öcalan’s scaling 
back of conditions for a solution to the Kurdish issue, as he openly argued that the problem in 
Turkey’s south-east would be resolved by meeting cultural demands of the Kurds, thereby 
shifting the goal of political autonomy to the background. The ceasefire and scaled back 
demands were understood inside the movement and by its followers as a genuine display of 
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the PKK desire to resolve the Kurdish issue by non-violent means. Being labelled as a 
terrorist organization, therefore, was experienced as a refusal to engage with the PKK – and 
by extension the Kurds – and clearing the way for a state-led approach to the issue. 
Considering the high-levels of Kurdish distrust of the Turkish state, it should have come as no 
surprise that conspiracy theories were soon circulating in the Kurdish media, or that a sense of 
betrayal by ‘the West’ or ‘Europe’ would become widespread among activists and supporters 
in Turkey and Europe. One human rights activist expressed his feelings thus: 
‘Europe is following Turkey’s line in calling our struggle ‘terrorism’. We are unhappy about 
the results of the European delegations that have come here. We show them everything, we 
take them to the destroyed villages, we talk to the families and so people relive their sufferings 
again, but there is no change to be seen at all. On the contrary, the movement is being called 
terrorist’ (Personal communication, Diyarbakir, 14 September 2007). 
The PKK sense of betrayal also needs to be understood in the light of suffering and sacrifices 
made by these Kurds and their communities in the armed conflict between the PKK and the 
state. In many of the interviews conducted by the author, Kurdish political activists have 
expressed their frustrations about the terrorist listing in these terms. Activists also relate more 
generally to ‘a politics of suffering’ that is actively maintained – through the commemoration 
of martyrs and significant traumatizing events – as a means both to keep in remembrance the 
unsettled accounts with the Turkish state and to continue to unite people under the PKK 
umbrella.7 
Concerns over the designation have been raised continuously in public political meetings in 
Europe. The following example, from an international conference on the EU and the Kurds, 
develops further the equation of PKK with (Turkish) Kurds, essentially a discourse of 
(assumed or claimed) representation:  
‘There are 20 million citizens of Kurdish origin [in Turkey] but still they present it as if it is a 
problem of terrorism. But the people have legitimate rights and they are not defending 
separatism. They seek peaceful coexistence. Autonomous regions are necessary in order to 
                                                           
7
 The demonization of terrorism and the glorification of freedom fighting both, of course, ignore the 
(extra)ordinary costs of human suffering that activists and their familes pay, extending to that of their lives; 
equally, however, the suffering of non-activist Kurds is ‘claimed’ by the PKK, even though those people 
themselves may be ambivalent about or even resent the PKK. These points are made just to give a sense some of 
the issues involved in the PKK sense of suffering – many more could be listed (and for both sides, of course). 
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freely live our identities. If you do not live up to any of these legitimate demands then it looks 
as if the Kurds are the cause of the problem. Is the EU aware of who is really responsible for 
the failure to find a solution: the Kurds or the state? To picture the Kurds as terrorists is unfair 
and ignoble. This has been a 25-year process that caused great suffering for Kurds and 
Turks….’ (Ahmet Gulabi Dere, diplomat for the KNK Brussels, 28 January, 20098). 
Such words testify to the shared sense among PKK activists and sympathizers that the 
organization’s terrorist designation has turned Kurds into the guilty party, from the victims of 
violence into its perpetrators, while ‘the state’ appears to escape blame. There is thus a 
collective feeling of being let down and misunderstood, confirming – in their eyes – the 
popular saying that ‘Kurds have no friends but the mountains.’ This partly explains the PKK’s 
unwillingness to refrain from maintaining its armed guerrilla forces, and its employment of a 
sporadic ‘dialogue through arms’.    
‘Those who go against the state system are being considered terrorists. But the solution lies in 
dialogue, the democratic method. […] They say that PKK is terrorist. No, PKK is the 
consequence and if the cause does not change, than the consequence will not change. PKK can 
lay down its weapons, but in the past this was always left unanswered. (Abdullah Demirbaş, 
then DTP Mayor, 2nd October 2008).9  
‘This is the wall that we are facing’ – diplomatic constraints 
The European Parliament and the European Commission have both voiced their support for 
Turkey’s struggle against terrorism in making calls for a peaceful solution. For example, the 
2009 Progress Report by the European Commission described the situation thus: 
‘During the reporting period Turkey faced continuous terrorist violence resulting in loss of 
life, despite a relative reduction of violence from the end of 2008. In December 2008 the 
European Union reaffirmed its support to Turkey in the fight against terrorism, which must be 
conducted with due regard for human rights, fundamental freedoms and international law’ 
(EC, 2009: 30). 
The political wing of the Kurdish movement, the DTP/BDP, has continuously voiced 
criticism of the EU’s terror designation as a way of dealing with the conflict, as obstructing 
any kind of official negotiation of national actors with the PKK. Regardless of the validity of 
                                                           
8
 From a speech given at the 5th EUTCC International conference on Turkey, EU and the Kurds, in the European 
Parliament, Brussels. 
9
 From a speech given at the conference on the EU-Turkey accession process, held by the Kurdish Institute of 
Brussels at the House of Parliamentarians, Brussels, 2nd October 2008. 
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this analysis – the PKK is officially ostracised from involvement in any internal process 
anyway by the Turkish state terrorist designation – the links that the DTP/BDP have had to 
the PKK have certainly caused them also to be directly affected by the designation. The sense 
that Europe was culpable in the DTP closure is hard to deny when the EU clearly implied that 
it was not working constructively in the political sphere: 
‘[The EP] ... Calls on the DTP, its members of parliament and mayors to distance themselves 
clearly from the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) and to engage constructively in the quest for 
a political solution to the Kurdish issue within the democratic Turkish state’ (EP, 2008). 
Turkey’s Kurdish question has long figured on the EU agenda (Tocci, 2005), and members of 
both the European Parliament and the Council of Europe continue to engage with Kurdish 
political activists who obviously have strong affiliations with the PKK. There is thus a clear 
implicit recognition of and support for at least some of the demands of the Kurdish 
movement. Nevertheless, while the cause might be seen as just and legitimate, most European 
politicians do not want to (be seen to) legitimize the PKK’s leading role in formulating and 
presenting it (Casier 2011).  As a result, there is no public acknowledgement of the PKK as 
one of the main representatives of Kurds from Turkey, which confirms the international 
public image of the PKK as nothing more than an armed terrorist organization and prevents 
recognition of it as, at the same time, a social and political movement enjoying considerable 
popular support (Eccarius-Kelly, 2002; Romano, 2006; Akkaya & Jongerden, 2010). In the 
words of one activist-journalist: 
‘The PKK is called a terrorist organization and the DTP cannot criticize that? But how can you 
explain that hundreds of thousands Kurds take the streets in Turkey and Europe with the same 
demands? Are they all terrorists? That is a scandal!’10  
There is an awareness amongst PKK militants that public recognition of their popular support 
would counteract the one-sided attention drawn by the Turkish state and now Europe and the 
USA to the ‘terrorist’ (and common criminal) activities of the PKK (Casier, 2011). And 
insofar as the DTP/BDP is seen as the political wing of the PKK, then its increasingly strong 
showing at local and national elections confirms this to the tune of several millions of votes.11 
Unfortunately, however, the War on Terror has complicated the already problematized 
understanding of armed conflicts and how these can be solved (Sheper-Hughes & Bourgeois, 
                                                           
10
 From an intervention from the floor during the conference on the EU-Turkey accession process (ibid.). 
11
 During the 2009 local elections the DTP almost doubled its number of municipality mayors, and attained the 
highest local assembly winning margins in the country. 
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2008). The upshot of all this in Europe has been to devote attention to pressing the 
government of Turkey on the matter of the cultural rights of Kurds, and paying less heed to 
the political demands of the Kurdish movement and the need to create a positive climate for 
peace negotiations. This has lead to increasing scepticism within PKK circles of the role the 
EU is willing to play in the resolution of Turkey’s Kurdish question by means of the 
accession process. As one leading PKK member puts it: 
‘As Kurds we have supported this process. We have worked hard in order to convince the 
people to give a date for the start of the accession negotiations. But when I look back now at 
what has happened, since the negotiations started, when we look at the Kurds present here 
today, than this is not an improvement. I wonder if we made the right choice to support this 
process? (…) Things are not progressing. With the support of the EU, Turkey is increasing the 
repression of the Kurdish people. Since the accession negotiations started, Kurds in Europe 
too have come to be looked upon as terrorists, with the support of certain European countries, 
such as Germany and France. [... ] If Turkey is willing to respect the criteria [of Copenhagen] 
then we will be in favour of accession, if it does not, than we will not be supportive.’  (Ahmet 
Gulabi Dere, diplomat for the Kurdish National Congress in Brussels, 2008).12 
In the latest EUTCC Conference on Turkey and the Kurds in the European Parliament 
(February 3rd, 2010), DTP/BDP Member of the Turkish General Assembly Sebahat Tüncel 
argued:  
‘The discourse on terrorism has been enormously damaging and it is the reason why the fact 
that DTP parliament members are sentenced to jail is not being discussed. […] The task for 
our European friends is to create opportunities for dialogue, and that is why it is necessary to 
put the concept of terror to discussion because now this is the wall that we are facing.’ 
A number of Kurdish activists, leading militants of the PKK in Europe especially, have come 
to see the EU as merely working in Turkey’s interests and against that of the Kurds. Adem 
Uzun, KNK Foreign Affairs member, reviewed the EU reports referred to thus: 
‘[I]n the post 9/11 period, taking courage from “the war against terror” and the “you are either 
with us, or against us” doctrine, Turkey escalated the war yet again. […] What we essentially 
would like to point out is that the EU’s approach is prejudiced, more so, it regards the matter 
within the framework of the demands of the Turkish state. […] As a result, the EU reports 
justify state violence. [...] The EU reports tend to impose [conditions] upon Kurds, even 
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 From a speech given at the conference on the EU-Turkey accession process, held by the Kurdish Institute of 
Brussels at the House of Parliamentarians, Brussels, 2nd October 2008. 
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ignoring their democratic rights by telling Kurds what kind of leaders they should choose for 
themselves’ (Uzun, at the EUTCC conference, February 2010). 
The charge against the EU of prejudice obviously needs shading – the EU is not a monolithic 
body with one single opinion. Support for the Kurdish cause in the Parliament comes mostly 
from the leftist parties, with centrist liberals also advocating for human rights (Casier 2011), 
but the parliament as a whole moved to the right at the last (2009) election, while the seat of 
EU power remains the Council, which always tends to be more conservative than the 
Parliament. The lack of action or outcry from Europe when the DTP was closed down testifies 
to the diminished support for the Kurdish party from within the EU institutions. This 
regardless the ousted criticisms by the Council of Europe, the Commission as well as the 
European Parliament on party closures in Turkey. Nevertheless, voices supportive of the 
Kurdish cause are to be heard. In respect to the pre-closure pressure on the DTP, for example, 
Olli Rehn (former EU Commissioner for Enlargement, responsible for overseeing Turkey’s 
candidacy), backgrounded the terrorism issue in coming out clearly in support of the party:  
‘We have consistently stressed that the fight against terrorism must be conducted with due 
regard for human rights and fundamental freedoms, in particular as regards freedom of 
expression and freedom of association. Political pluralism is an integral part of any 
democracy. The Turkish parliament is today largely representative of the country's political 
diversity. DTP has been contributing to pluralism in Turkey, with its political legitimacy 
confirmed by the results of the March municipal elections. At the same time, the people of the 
Southeast of Turkey need peace, stability and prosperity rather than further violence and 
confrontation. […] In this context, we have reiterated to Turkey that the Turkish legal 
provisions governing the closure of political parties are not in line with the European 
Convention of Human Rights and with European practices’ (Rehn, 2009, emphasis added). 
In direct contacts with EU politicians, however, it is the case that DTP/BDP representatives 
have been continuously asked to dissociate themselves from the PKK or to clarify their 
relationship. In a discussion with the then leader of the DTP group in the Turkish General 
Assembly (and current co-chair of the BDP), the DTP/BDP position on this was outlined in 
no uncertain terms: 
‘We are not going to consider the PKK a terrorist organization. We have to explain this in 
Europe too. Terrorist organizations in Afghanistan and Iraq are terrorist organizations. What is 
a terrorist organization and how should we combat it, is an important question. But the PKK 
18 
 
does not belong in the list, because it has different roots, different reasons of existence and its 
fight is a different fight’ (Selahattin Demirtaş, personal communication, Diyarbakir, 22 
September 2007).  
The closure of the DTP has, in this regard, played out in favour of the PKK’s holding on to its 
arms. In fact, the terrorist listing can be said to have polarized politics in the south-east of 
Turkey. Kerckhove’s ‘asset’ for ‘leverage’ (above) has had the effect of hardening support for 
the ‘terrorists’. Shortly after the DTP closure, for example, its leader went on record for the 
first time to state the role of Öcalan in his party’s politics.13 This is also acknowledged by 
Kurdish politicians who are not associated with the PKK or DTP/BDP, such as Haşim 
Haşimi, former Welfare Party MP and former Mayor of Cizre:  
‘Whoever says that the PKK is a terrorist organization will not gain any votes anymore. You 
cannot ignore the reality. The shadow of Öcalan is there and to call him a terrorist will not 
solve the problems’ (Personal communication, Diyarbakir, 20 September 2007).  
Being labelled ‘terrorists’, therefore, has increased the symbolic political and societal 
isolation of the PKK and affiliated organizations in Turkey and in Europe, increased the felt 
sense of injustice experienced by activists, and played a part in the muzzling of their views as 
expressed in conventional arena of party politics. On the international political stage, the 
voices of Kurdish activists and diplomats remain marginal, and the floor is being given over 
to the ruling AKP and its initiative addressing the Kurdish issue, which receives warm 
support. AKP measures have been confined mostly to soft options that could count upon the 
approval of most European politicians. The Kurdish issue has become somewhat de-
politicized in the eyes of the European outsiders, as well as a majority of the Turkish public.  
In contrast to this de-politicization, Kurdish political activists and their supporters have 
become increasingly political in recent years. The continuous isolation of the Kurdish 
movement appears to have led to a sharpened Kurdish nationalist discourse, with rising 
Kurdish demands (as compared to the years immediately following Öcalan’s arrest) and an 
increase in Euro-scepticism amongst Kurdish activists and diplomats. Actions undertaken by 
PKK-related groups in Europe meanwhile, their efforts to have the Kurds rally around the 
PKK leadership, evidence a resolute unwillingness to be sidelined. 
                                                           
13
 It was through Öçalan, declared Ahmet Türk (ex-DTP leader), that DTP MPs reversed their decision to resign 
their seats (reported at: http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/13242730.asp).   
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‘We have to find a way to explain that this is not a good approach to the reality of the 
Kurds’ – in search of political restoration. 
Faced with the ‘terrorist’ label, the PKK and affiliated organizations and parties have 
developed a number of coping strategies in order to regain their political legitimacy and seek 
political restoration. Legal and political initiatives have been taken and social-political protest 
events launched. The many quotations in this paper, stemming from the interviews and 
observations conducted by the author, also bear testimony in themselves to the efforts of 
Kurdish political activists to seek political recognition.  
The PKK debated the justice of the terrorist designation before the European court in 
Luxemburg (as mentioned), through its representatives in the Kurdistan National Congress 
(KNK) and Abdullah Öcalan’s brother Osman. Arguments objecting to the listing on 
substantive grounds became untenable with the end of the unilateral ceasefire in 2004 and 
bomb blasts in western Turkish cities in 2005 and 2006, according to one of the lawyers on 
the case (personal communication, London, 27 July 2009), so the case was won only on 
procedural grounds of due process. However, the verdict did not affect the later listings and 
the PKK by the EU. 
A range of other legal efforts have been undertaken with the intention of restoring the 
legitimacy of the PKK. A conference was held at prestigious British Chattam House over the 
question whether or not the PKK could be considered a non-state armed group and, 
consequently, fall within the confines of International War and Humanitarian Law. The same 
question was also addressed at the 2007 EUTCC conference, where many of the debates that 
year pointed in particular to the need to incorporate the PKK into negotiations over the future 
of Turkey’s Kurdish question and its resolution. More generally, a large part of the lobbying 
work of the European Parliament by Kurdish organizations and other groups and individuals 
has been directed at the creation of a political space which is inclusive of the PKK, and thus 
devoted to the survival and strengthening of the position of the party and its leader (Casier 
2011). This goal was also actively pursued by the DTP in their diplomatic activities:  
‘We want to exchange views with the EU. We want to make clear to them what the problem is and 
make clear what we demand. Many institutions that are responsible for the activities in Europe are being 
closed down. We want them to be able to do their job again. But the main issue is to remember what the 
problem is and what the solutions can be, for example through conferences. Due to calling the PKK 
terrorist, all institutions are now being called terrorist. We have to find a way to explain that this is not a 
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good approach to the reality of the Kurds’  (Selahattin Demirtaş, personal communication Diyarbakir, 
22 September 2007). 
To this end, a comprehensive effort has been undertaken by the International Initiative 
‘Freedom for Abdullah Öcalan – Peace in Kurdistan’. This association has aimed at the 
international restoration of Öcalan’s position as the political leader of the Kurds, since his 
capture and imprisonment in 1999. Former lawyers of Öcalan have been involved in its 
activities, which include the pursuit of various strategies aimed at bringing Öcalan to the 
foreground in the international community. Öcalan’s defence texts (presented at the Court of 
Athens and at the European Court of Human Rights) were published in book form and his 
ideological changes and demands presented in several brochures and leaflets in different 
European languages. The Initiative has also undertaken continuous actions to call for a 
condemnation of Öcalan’s prison conditions on Imralli island, rallied for support for Öcalan 
in the Council of Europe and obtained a number of members to sign a motion for resolution 
on ‘The state of health of Mr. Abdullah Öcalan.’  
In 2006 the Freedom Initiative co-organized another major campaign launched by KON-
KURD, the umbrella federation of all Kurdish federations in Europe. The campaign called 
upon the Kurds to sign a petition in which they would declare: ‘I, from Kurdistan, recognize 
Mr. Abdullah OCALAN as a political representative in Kurdistan.’14 Some three and a quarter 
million people ‘from Kurdistan’ have signed the petition to date. The petition was handed 
over to the European Parliament and the Council of Europe to send a clear message that 
Öcalan – given his popular support – should be incorporated in the negotiations over a 
resolution of the Kurdish issue. In 2009, the International Initiative was actively involved in 
sustaining Öcalan’s initiative to push forward a roadmap to peace. 
In Britain, meanwhile, an international initiative of political organizations from different 
countries that found themselves on the UK terrorist list was established, in which the PKK is 
involved. CAMPACC has been operating in coordination with the Peace in Kurdistan 
campaign and the Kurdish National Congress (KNK) London and also started a petition 
addressed to the British government calling for the delisting of the PKK in Great Britain and 
aiming at the collection of 10 000 signatures.  
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 URL: http://www.freedom-for-ocalan.com/english/aktuell/campaign/konkurd-form.pdf. 
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This brief sketch of initiatives gives an impression of some of the approaches being taken in 
support of the PKK in Europe. The International Initiative was successful in pressuring the 
CPT to conduct fact-finding missions and bring members of the Council of Europe to adopt a 
resolution on Abdullah Öcalan, ultimately leading to a reconsideration in Turkey of his prison 
conditions. Other initiatives, such as the petition that gathered over three million signatures 
did not seem to have a very clear direct impact. Taken as a whole, however, these initiatives 
do testify to the ongoing popularity of the PKK and its leader, indicative of the problematic 
nature of its designation as mere terrorists.  
 
THE PKK IMPACT ON AND THE TURKEY-EU ACCESSION PROCESS 
The PKK seeks both national and international recognition as the main representative of 
Turkey’s Kurds. This quest is undoubtedly problematic in that it foregoes political and 
societal realities inside the country, where Kurds greatly differ in the extent to which they 
identify with their ethnicity, and how they relate their personal daily concerns to the political 
aspirations and promises of different political parties. Given that it swept the elections in the 
South-East during its early years in office, one could argue – and it has indeed been argued by 
Prime Minister Erdoğan himself – that the ruling AKP is the primary representative of the 
Kurds (Bahcheli & Sid, 2011). However, even a majority in numbers is merely that: it does 
not undo the significant impact that the PKK as a social-political movement has in the region. 
This impact translates into votes for the DTP/BDP, and the Kurdish constituents certainly do 
consider a vote for the pro-Kurdish parties to be ‘voting PKK’ (Marcus 2007b).  
Over the last two decades an alternative socio-political reality has come into being in the 
Kurdish dominated region of Turkey. It is unlikely that any ‘Kurdish initiative’ that neglects 
this reality or, for that matter, seeks to ‘win back to society’ the populace there will succeed in 
the short run. It is to be expected that huge numbers of politicized Kurdish citizens will 
continue to appoint the DTP/BDP and thus indirectly the PKK to speak on their behalf. A 
continued neglect of this reality, and/or active policies to hamper these political (and societal) 
actors through judicial short-winging and counter-terrorism, promises ongoing disengagement 
of this part of the Kurdish constituency from the Turkish state and society and increases 
Kurdish nationalist demands (see also Casier, Jongerden & Walker, forthcoming). The 
apparent deepening of mass support for the DTP/BDP against the AKP and the hardening of 
the Kurdist position appear as evidence for this. 
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Obviously the ongoing refusal to enter into negotiations with the ‘terrorists’ (and ultimately a 
process of political integration) provides little incentives for the PKK to entirely abandon 
armed struggle as a resource. Therefore the armed campaign continues, even though it has 
become a low-intensity conflict in the post 1999 era. Indeed, Kurdish activist perceptions of 
the Kurdish opening as culminating in the closure of the DTP have already led, it would seem, 
to the suspension of the PKK ceasefire in the summer of 2010 and a ‘a new era’ of violence. 
What form this new era may take is unclear, but there certainly seems to be a ‘higher risk’ in 
particular of PKK attacks on ‘high profile, relatively soft, targets in the cities of western 
Turkey’ (Jenkins 2010) – or, terrorism, by any standards. 
The continued violence brings along new grievances on both sides, constantly reviving both 
Turkish and Kurdish nationalist feelings that then translate into further societal friction, 
including civil unrest and the outward discrimination of Kurdish citizens in Turkish cities 
(Yeğen, 2011; Kentel, 2011). A destabilizing factor in Turkish politics, the continuation of the 
armed conflict thus raises serious internal (as well as cross-border) security issues. This is all 
the more so as the continuation of the conflict, and the anti-terror policies that accompany it, 
allow for undue restrictions in the spheres of the freedom of speech, freedom of press, 
freedom of organization and the freedom of political parties, and thus slows down the needed 
legal and judicial reforms in Turkey.  
It is exactly these consequences that affect the Turkey-EU accession process, wherein 
Turkey’s human rights records and the process of democratization, demanding both political 
demilitarization and a depoliticization of the Turkish judiciary,  have been continuous matters 
of concern for the member-states, the European Commission, the Council of Europe and the 
European Parliament (see Tocci, 2005). Indeed, the continued raising of these concerns is also 
what led (in the first half of the 2000s) to a number of accommodations of the Kurdish 
demands in Turkey that could never have been realized were it not for the bargaining space 
the EU provided the successive the Turkish governments. However, the ongoing atmosphere 
of ‘being under threat’ places serious obstacles in front of any government that wants to go 
ahead with the necessary reforms in the crucial domains of the judiciary and the military. A 
politically negotiated solution of the Kurdish issue, including the armed conflict is therefore 
intimately linked with the success or failure of the Turkey-EU accession process.  
 
CONCLUSION  
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The designation of the PKK as an international terrorist organization has seriously affected 
the Kurdish nationalist movement and its supporters’ trust in the international institutions, 
particularly the EU. This has brought some scholars, notably Uslu (2008), to the reasonable 
conclusion that the PKK has turned against Turkey’s accession to the European Union. 
Nevertheless, the evidence presented in this paper suggests a different interpretation of the 
PKK position, that the criticisms and the diminishing support for accession amongst the 
Kurdish constituents be understood first, in the context of the position in Turkey – with the 
competition from the AKP – and second, in the context of the PKK proscription as a terrorist 
organization and the associated pressure brought to bear on the politically successful DTP. 
With this in mind the strong anti-EU rhetoric of the PKK can be seen as one part of its 
ongoing struggle to (re)gain political legitimacy and create a political space that is inclusive 
of the movement that represents Turkey’s most politicized Kurds.  
The coming months and years will therefore be decisive for the PKK as it chooses whether or 
not to continue to support or opt out of the Turkey-EU accession negotiations. The thrust of 
this paper is to suggest that this is certainly not yet decided; the PKK has not renounced its 
support of Turkey’s accession to the European Union, but rather has come to make its support 
conditional upon its own recognition as a political actor in the negotiations in particular, and 
Turkey’s politics more generally. If the EU continues to list the PKK as a terrorist group and 
pressure the pro-Kurdish party in Turkey (now BDP) on its PKK relationship, then those 
(historically dominant) forces in Turkey that prefer to neglect Kurdish political representation 
will be further strengthened. Politically ignored and no longer militarily able to fight a 
guerrilla war, the PKK may indeed feel pushed towards full blown terrorism. The terrorist 
listing may become a self fulfilling category for another generation to deal with.   
24 
 
REFERENCES 
 
Adamson, F. (2002) Mobilizing for the Transformation of Home: Politicized Identities and 
Transnational Practices, in: Al-Ali, N. and K. Koser (Eds.) New Approaches to Migration? 
Transnational Communities and the Transformation of Home  (London: Routledge). 
Akkaya, A.H. and J. Jongerden (2011) The PKK in the 2000s: Continuity through breaks?, in: 
M. Casier & J. Jongerden, J. (Eds) Nationalisms and politics in Turkey: political Islam, 
kemalism and the Kurdish issue (London: Routledge).  
Bahcheli, T. and S. Noel (2011) The Justice and Development Party and the Kurdish 
Question, in: M. Casier & J. Jongerden (Eds) Nationalisms and politics in Turkey: political 
islam, kemalism and the Kurdish issue (London: Routledge). 
Casier, M. (2010) Turkey’s Kurds and the Quest for Recognition. Transnational Politics and 
the EU-Turkey accession negotiations, Ethnicities, 10 (1), pp.3-25. 
Casier, M. (2011) The Politics of Solidarity. The Kurdish Question in the European 
Parliament, in: M. Casier & J. Jongerden, J. (Eds) Nationalisms and politics in Turkey: 
political Islam, kemalism and the Kurdish issue (London: Routledge).  
Casier, M., A. Hilton & J. Jongerden (2009) “Road Maps” and Roadblocks in Turkey’s 
Southeast, Middle East Report Online, 30 October 2009.  
URL: http://www.merip.org/mero/mero103009.html 
Cizre, Ü. (2008) Ideology, context and interest:  the Turkish Military, in: Kasaba, R. (Ed.) The 
Cambridge History of Turkey. Volume 4. Turkey in the Modern World (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press). 
Eccarius-Kelly, V. (2002) Political Movements and Leverage Points: Kurdish Activism in the 
European Diaspora, Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs, 22 (1), pp.91-118. 
EC (2001) Council Common Position 2001/931/CFSP of 27 December 2001 on the 
application of specific measures to combat terrorism.  
URL: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2001:344:0093:0096:EN:PDF 
25 
 
EC (2002) Council Common Position 2002/340/CFSP of 2 May 2002 updating Council 
Common Position 2001/931/CFSP on the application of specific measures to combat 
terrorism.  
URL: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2002:116:0075:0077:EN:PDF 
EC (2004) Council Common Position 2004/500/CFSP of 17 May 2004 updating Common 
Position 2001/931/CFSP on the application of specific measures to combat terrorism and 
repealing Common Position 2004/309/CFSP. 
URL: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:32004E0500:EN:HTML  
EC (2009) Turkey 2009 Progress Report, October 14th 2009 (Doc. SEC(2009)1334), 
Brussels: Commission Staff Working Document. 
URL: http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2009/tr_rapport_2009_en.pdf 
EP (2008) Report on Turkey's 2007 progress report (2007/2269(INI)), European Parliament: 
Committee on Foreign Affairs (A6-0168/2008). 
URL: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//NONSGML+REPORT+A6-
2008-0168+0+DOC+PDF+V0//EN 
Gambetti, Z. (2008) Conflict, ‘commun-ication’ and the role of collective action in the 
formation of public spheres, in: Shami, S., (ed.) Publics, Politics and Participation: Locating 
the Public Sphere in the Middle East and North Africa (New York: SSRC Books). 
Gambetti, Z. (2008) Decolonizing Diyarbakir: culture, identity and the struggle to appropriate 
urban space, in: K. A. Ali and M. Rieker (Eds) Re-exploring The Urban: Comparative 
Citiscapes in the Middle East and South Asia (Karachi: Oxford University Press). 
Grojean, O. (2008) La cause kurde, de la Turquie vers l’Europe, Phd. Thesis, Ecole des 
Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales, Paris. URL: http://oliviergrojean.hautetfort.com/these/ 
Gunter, M. (2008) The Kurds Ascending. The Evolving Solution to the Kurdish Problem in 
Iraq and Turkey (New York: Palgrave/McMillan). 
Jenkins G. (2009) After DTP closure: from dialogue to monologue?, Turkey Analyst,  
vol. 2 no. 23. URL: http://www.silkroadstudies.org/new/inside/turkey/2009/091221A.html.   
Jenkins G. (2010) The PKK insurgency enters a new era, Turkey Analyst, vol. 3 no. 12. URL: 
http://www.silkroadstudies.org/new/inside/turkey/2010/100621A.html.   
26 
 
Jongerden, J. (2007) The Settlement Issue in Turkey and the Kurds. An Analysis of Spatial 
Policies, Modernity and War (Leiden: Brill Publishers). 
Jongerden, J. & A. Akkaya (2011) Born from the Left. The making of the PKK, in: Casier, M. 
& J. Jongerden (Eds.) Nationalisms and Politics Turkey: political islam, kemalism and the 
Kurdish issue (London: Routledge).  
Kentel,F (2011) ‘Nationalist’ reconstructions in the light of disappearing borders, in: Casier, 
M. & J. Jongerden (Eds.) Nationalisms and Politics Turkey: political islam, kemalism and the 
Kurdish issue (London: Routledge).  
Østergaard-Nielsen, E. K. (2001) The Politics of Migrants’ Transnational Political Practices, 
Paper presented at the Conference on Transnational Migration: Comparative perspectives, 
Princeton University, June-July.  
Öktem, K. (2008) The patronising embrace: Turkey’s new Kurdish strategy, Occasional 
Paper, Stiftung Forschungsstelle Schweiz-Türkei and Kerem Öktem, Basel, February 2008. 
URL: http://www.sfst.ch/typo3/fileadmin/user_upload/dateien/OP_Oktem_08-02.pdf 
Marcus, A. (2007a) Turkey’s PKK: Rise, Fall, Rise Again? World Policy Journal, Spring, 
pp.74-84. 
Marcus, A. (2007b) Blood and Belief. The PKK and the Kurdish Fight for Independence 
(New York/London: New York University Press). 
Mc Dowall, D. (1996) A modern history of the Kurds (London/New York: IB Tauris). 
Romano, D. (2006) The Kurdish Nationalist Movement: Opportunity, Mobilization and 
Identity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). 
Posch, W. (2007) Crisis in Turkey: just another bump in the road to Europe? EUISS 
Ocassional Papers 67 (Paris: European Union Institute for Security Studies).  
URL: http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/occ67.pdf 
Sheper-Hughes, N. & Bourgois, P. (2008) (Eds) Violence in War and Peace. An Anthology 
(Malden/Oxford: Blackwell Publishing). 
Taspinar, O. (2005) Kurdish Nationalism and Political Islam in Turkey. Kemalist Identity in 
Transition (London: Routledge).  
27 
 
Tocci, Nathalie (2005) ‘Conflict Resolution in the Neighbourhood: Comparing the Role of the 
EU in the Turkish-Kurdish and Israeli-Palestinian Conflicts’, CEPS Working Documents No. 
221. 
UK (2001) The Terrorism Act 2000 (Proscribed Organisations) (Amendment) Order 2001 
(Statutory Instrument 2001 No. 1261) (London: Queen's Printer of Acts of Parliament). 
URL: http://www.opsi.gov.uk/si/si2001/20011261.htm 
Uslu, E. (2008) The Kurdistan Workers’ Party Turns against the European Union. 
Mediterranean Quarterly, 19(2), pp.99-120. 
Van Bruinessen, M. (1998) Shifting national and ethnic identities, Journal of Muslim 
Minority Affairs, 8 (1), pp.39-53.___ 
Watts, N.F. (2006) Activists in Office: Pro-Kurdish Contentious Politics in Turkey, 
Ethnopolitics, 5(2), pp.125-144. 
Watts, N.F. (2004) Institutionalizing Virtual Kurdistan West: Transnational Networks and 
Ethnic Contention in International Affairs, in: J. S. Migdal, Boundaries and Belonging: States 
and Societies in the Struggle to Shape Identities and Local Pratices (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press). 
Yeğen, M. (2011) The Kurdish question in Turkey: denial to recognition, in: Casier, M. & J. 
Jongerden (Eds.) Nationalisms and Politics Turkey: political islam, kemalism and the Kurdish 
issue (London: Routledge).  
 
